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We investigate how group boundaries, and the economic environment surrounding groups, 
affect altruistic cooperation and punishment behavior. Our study uses experiments conducted 
with 525 officers in the Swiss Army, and exploits random assignment to platoons. We find 
that, without competition between groups, individuals are more prone to cooperate 
altruistically in a prisoner’s dilemma game with in-group as opposed to out-group members. 
They also use a costly punishment option to selectively harm those who defect, encouraging 
a norm of cooperation towards the group. Adding competition between groups causes even 
stronger in-group cooperation, but also a qualitative change in punishment: punishment 
becomes antisocial, harming cooperative and defecting out-group members alike. These 
findings support recent evolutionary models and have important organizational implications. 
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Many benecial exchanges require humans to cooperate and trust each other, even though
narrow self-interest may tempt them to act selshly. Evidence suggests, however, that
while altruistic cooperation is measurable it is often not strong enough on its own to
sustain high levels of cooperation (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Rather, cooperation is
often sustained by a willingness of subjects to expend resources to impose harm on others
who act selshly; this altruistic, and costly, informal sanctioning can deter defection
(G uth et al., 1982; Roth, 1995; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Falk et al., 2005). The pervasive
tendency for formal contracts to be incomplete (Williamson et al., 1975; Ostrom, 1990;
Hechter and Opp, 2001; Knez and Simester, 2001; MacLeod, 2007) underlines the many
potential opportunities for informal sanctions to improve eciency within societies and
organizations.
However, the idea that punishment helps enforce a norm of cooperation that leads to ef-
ciency gains, and is therefore a pro-social motivation, is hotly contended (Dreber et al.,
2008; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Herrmann et al., 2008; Houser et al., 2008; Abbink et al.,
2010). Herrmann et al. (2008) show that in many societies punishment does not punish
solely defections from the supposed norm of cooperation, but rather takes the form of
antisocial punishment. The latter form of punishment denotes the sanctioning of people
who behave cooperatively. Such antisocial punishment does not enhance eciency, but
instead wastes resources of both the punisher and the punished. Rather than sustain-
ing cooperation, antisocial punishment impedes cooperation. The fundamental question
addressed in this paper is under which conditions the benecial or harmful form of pun-
ishment manifests? In other words, we examine the determinants of prosocial, altruistic
punishment versus antisocial punishment.1
1We follow the terminology in the literature, and refer to costly punishment of defectors as \altruistic
punishment" (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Herrmann et al., 2008).
2The central premise of this paper is that the interaction of social group membership, with
the economic conditions of inter-group relationships (mutual independence or competi-
tion), is the key to understanding in which situations punishment may be a prosocial
act to foster cooperation and when it might turn into eciency-reducing antisocial pun-
ishment. We run experiments with 525 ocers in the Swiss Army. For the duration
of its ocer training program, the Army randomly forms platoons of the ocer candi-
dates, thus providing us with a strong, yet exogenous manipulation of group membership.
We can show that when there is no competition between groups, individuals cooperate
more in a prisoner's dilemma game with in-group members than with out-group members.
They also use a punishment option to enforce cooperation norms, especially towards their
group. Importantly, we do not nd that individuals punish others more simply because
they are members of another group. Hence, group boundaries per se create a punishment
mechanism that favors a norm of cooperation within one's group.
In a second treatment, we add competition between groups to the experiment. In this
treatment, the tendency to cooperate with in-group members is even more pronounced.
As we explain in section 2, we add the competition between groups such that it leaves
the monetary payos from punishment unchanged. Thus, any change in punishment be-
havior must be due solely to the creation of a more competitive atmosphere, not because
of a change in which punishment can aect outcomes. We nd a qualitative, and dra-
matic change in punishment patterns: We nd strong out-group hostility, in the sense
that out-group members are punished harder, and punishment is applied to cooperative
and defecting out-group members alike. Thus, punishment here takes on the qualitative
pattern of antisocial punishment directed towards the out-group. Thus, our results show
that competition triggers a non-strategic desire to harm the out-group, even though this
is personally costly. These ndings are in line with recent evolutionary models, in which
altruism survives partly because, in times of scarcity, it can make people willing to engage
3in personally costly attacks on competing groups (Choi and Bowles, 2007; Bowles, 2009).
Recently, social group membership eects have received a lot of attention in the economics
literature. One the one hand, it has been argued that individuals have social preferences
that favor the in-group. So, membership in various groups may aect the willingness
of members of an organization to engage in prosocial behavior like altruistic coopera-
tion, or norm enforcement, which enhances eciency but involves no personal material
reward (see, e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005). On the other hand, it has been
conjectured that group membership could have a dark side as well (e.g., Durlauf, 1999)
by leading to strong out-group hostility (for a survey, see Hewstone et al., 2002).2 Sadly,
it is obvious that many political conicts and wars are along (ethnic) group lines (see,
e.g., Blattman and Miguel, 2010) and it is a strong empirical regularity that ethnic diver-
sity, i.e. intense interaction of dierent groups, decreases cooperation (e.g., Alesina et al.,
1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007). Interestingly, though, one can think of many examples
where group boundaries do not necessarily lead to conict. Therefore, there has to be an
additional factor on top of group membership per se that triggers out-group hostility.
Of course, it has already been shown experimentally that competition between groups
has behavioral implications for in-group and between-group interactions, leading to more
cooperation within groups (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994; Bornstein et al., 2002; Augen-
blick and Cunha, 2009). Similar to earlier studies, we also nd that competition increases
cooperation within groups, without generating a taste for harming the out-group (Halevy
et al., 2008). Our results are similar, in that we nd hostility is not expressed through
cooperation decisions.
We dier from the earlier literature by examining how group boundaries and competition
2Note that, conceptually, in-group favoritism need not be the ip-side of out-group hostility. Individ-
uals might favor the in-group, without going out of their way to harm the out-group (see, e.g., Bahry
et al. (2005) for evidence of inter-ethnic trust in Russia).
4aect the motives behind punishment, moving it closer to the experimental study of con-
icts. Research studies using eld data have often conjectured that competition explains
when groups are in conict and when they are not. For example, the extent of competi-
tion for political power has been argued to explain why the Chewas and the Tubukas are
enemies in Malawi, but are friends right across the border in Zambia (Posner, 2004), and
conict between natives and immigrants has been linked to the extent of competition in
the job market (Esses et al., 1998). The main challenge for this type of study, however, is
the presence of many factors that confound a clean identication of group eects per se,
and of the eect of the economic environment. For example, groups typically dier accord-
ing to many characteristics, and these dierences could drive behavior rather than group
membership. The extent of competition is also often not randomly assigned, raising the
concern that more hostile types self-select into competitive situations. Also, behavioral
measures have typically not allowed disentangling strategic motives from non-strategic
motives that lead to conict between groups.3
Our approach of using Army ocers is useful because it keeps many aspects from the
eld while still leveraging the advantages of experimental methods. We build, in general,
on Goette et al. (2006), where we investigated in-group and out-group eects, but did
not examine how cooperation and punishment behavior interact with absence or presence
of competition. The use of randomly assigned real groups, i.e., platoons, has signicant
advantages over most previous approaches. Studies based on real groups or existing
friends (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Bahry et al., 2005; Bernhard et al., 2006;
Leider et al., 2009) analyze groups with social content and social ties which is an important
aspect of real groups. However, these groups are endogenously formed or dier in other
3The seminal study in psychology involved young boys being randomly assigned to dierent groups at a
summer camp, and being observed as they rst played competitive games, and then engaged in cooperative
activities (Sherif et al., 1961). Our study is dierent because we use adults, and more importantly because
we have controlled choice experiments where anonymity allows disentangling strategic and non-strategic
motives.
5dimensions than just their group membership (i.e. ethnicity), making inferences about
the eects of groups per se dicult. A solution to these confounds is to randomly assign
individuals to so-called \minimal" groups which are nothing more than a label (e.g., Tajfel
et al., 1971; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Sutter, 2009). By design, these
groups lack any social content and behavior might be very dierent from real groups, as
shown in Goette et al. (2010). Combining the advantages of both group manipulation
methods, our groups do have social content as groups in the former method, but are at
the same time randomly assigned as groups in the minimal group-paradigm.
Our results t well with previous evidence that antisocial punishment is especially pro-
nounced in societies with more "close-knit" social networks, where people may perceive
everyone outside their network as a competitor (Herrmann et al., 2008). Importantly, in
contrast to earlier studies documenting the patterns of altruistic punishment (Fehr and
Gachter, 2000) or antisocial punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008; Abbink et al., 2010), we
have been able to trigger each by an experimental treatment, thus integrating the seem-
ingly contradictory, earlier ndings on the altruistic or antisocial form of punishment in
a unied framework. The latter is a main contribution of this paper.
Our results also have important economic implications, in terms of understanding the
role of group boundaries, and inter-group competition, within organizations. While other
studies have examined the impact of social ties on behavior within organizations (e.g.,
Bandiera et al., 2010), our study uses assignment to groups as an exogenous manipulation
of social ties, and identies a potential trade-o for rms of fostering competition between
social groups: A more competitive scheme may yield more cooperation within groups, but
more hostility between groups. Think of a company that lets two teams develop ideas for
an advertisement campaign for a new product. A competitive incentive scheme could give
a large bonus to the team that comes up with the more convincing campaign, perhaps even
ring the other one, while a non-competitive scheme might simply pay the baseline salary
6whichever team produces the more promising campaign. The competitive scheme might
increase eorts and cohesion within teams while limiting the opportunity to exchange
ideas across teams, although such an exchange could lead to an even better campaign.
Even more so, it might lead to destructive acts of withholding important information
for the rival team, although providing it would benet the company as a whole. Our
results show that such a tradeo can be tipped in favor of one or the other direction by
changing the economic environment in which teams act. Thus, there is a delicate balance
of cooperation and punishment within and between groups.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce the experimental design.
Section 3 presents behavioral hypotheses, and section 4 reports the experimental results.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Experimental Design
We design experiments in the Swiss Army, which allows us to exploit the random assign-
ment of individuals into platoons as our group manipulation. We then use two experiments
and two treatments in each experiment to investigate the eect of competition between
groups on cooperation and particularly on norm enforcement.
2.1 Subject Pool and Random Group Assignment
All Swiss males are required to perform at least 300 days of military service, beginning
with twenty-one weeks of basic training. In week seven, about one fourth are selected
to go through ten weeks of ocer-candidate training. Of these, one fourth are promoted
to ocers and continue on to the Joint Ocer Training Program (JOTP).4 Whereas
4The Swiss Army is organized as a reserve system and also ocers - after the training - serve only a
couple of days per year in the Army.
7ocer-candidate training is specic for each branch of service, and occurs in separate
locations, JOTP brings new ocers from all branches of service together, to the same
location, for four weeks. Ocers are randomly assigned to a platoon at the beginning of
JOTP, and spend virtually all time during the day with their platoon. Training involves
mainly coursework on principles of security, combat in large military units, logistics, and
leadership. At the end of JOTP, the platoons are dissolved and ocers are once again
sent to separate locations, for further, advanced training specic to each branch of service.
We use the random assignment of candidates to platoons in JOTP as our manipulation of
social groups. Each platoon is identied by a dierent number. Assignment to platoons
is random, and stratied according to the dierent branches of service. The Army assigns
platoons orthogonally to any previous social ties among ocers with the aim of promoting
exchanges of perspectives among dierent individuals and branches of service.
The assignment mechanism is ideal, in several ways, for investigating the impact of group
membership on behavior. First, trainees know that platoon composition is designed to
be identical and that nobody could choose which platoon to join. Indeed, statistical tests
reveal no signicant dierences in platoon composition, by branch of service, education,
or age. Second, there is no competition between the groups (or trainees) for evaluations or
other resources. Relative performance evaluations were completed previously, in candidate
training. Thus, there is no function of the group assignment, other than to aect the circle
of individuals with whom an ocer interacts most frequently. Third, social interactions
within a platoon are intense. Platoon members spend the whole workday with their
group, for the three weeks leading up to our experiments. Despite the fact that platoons
are assigned orthogonally to previous social ties, social interactions and ties also arise
endogenously within platoons in after-work time: In a questionnaire, ocers in our study
report to a question on \How often do you spend o-duty time with members of a) your
own platoon or b) the other platoons?" that they spend signicantly more time o-duty
8with members of their own platoon. This is remarkable in itself, given that 79.8 percent
of the trainees know people in other platoons, mostly from earlier stages of their training.
Yet, as illustrated in Table 1, they choose to spend most of what little o-duty time they
have with members of their newly assigned group. Thus, platoon assignment provides a
strong group manipulation.
[Table 1 about here.]
By using randomly assigned real groups we do not have to rely on arbitrary, minimal
groups that lack social ties as a key component of groups. But we also do not have to
rely on endogenously formed groups (as in, e.g., Leider et al., 2009) or on groups that
dier in other dimensions than just membership to dierent groups, e.g. nationality or
ethnicity (as in, e.g., Bernhard et al., 2006; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Bahry et al., 2005).
This allows us to make inference about the causal eect of real groups on behavior.
2.2 Experiments and Group Conditions
In the third week of the four-week training period, we conducted two experiments with
the ocer candidates to see how random group assignment and random introduction of
competition between groups aect behavior. In this subsection we present the two types
of experiments and in the next subsection we introduce the two treatments with which
we vary the economic environment as being competitive or non-competitive.
Experiment 1: Cooperation. The game was a simultaneous prisoners' dilemma (PD).
The players, labeled A1 and A2, were each endowed with 20 points worth real money
(4 points = 1 CHF). They simultaneously decided whether to keep the points or pass
all of them to the other player. Passed points were doubled. Thus, if both players
passed their points (cooperation), they each got 40 points. However, a selsh player
9could always do better by keeping the points (defecting), regardless of the other player's
decision: Defecting when the other defected would yield 20, whereas cooperating would
sacrice the endowment and yield nothing in return; defecting when the other cooperated
would yield 60, the maximum possible individual payo in the game (while leaving the
cooperator with 0). Cooperation thus entails lowering one's own payo, and improving
the payo of the other player, and is an indicator of non-selsh motives. We use the game
as our workhorse for studying how group boundaries, and economic environment, aect
non-selsh motives for cooperation.
Experiment 1 involved two conditions in a between-subject design. In all conditions, a
subject never learned the individual identity of their partner. In the in-group condition,
subjects interacted anonymously, except for being informed that the other player was a
member of their own platoon. The out-group condition was the same, except subjects
were informed that the other player was a member of another platoon. Group aliation
was clearly marked on the decision sheets. These conditions allow us to examine how
group assignment aects cooperation. For a selsh individual, the group aliation will
not change the prediction that he will always defect.
We also elicited individual's beliefs about in-group and out-group cooperation. Indepen-
dent of the condition they were in, we asked participants to state both their belief for
in- and out-group cooperation. We asked them to predict the percentage of the in- and
out-group that would send all of the points (cooperate). They were given an incentive
to make their best guess: they knew that their prediction would be compared to the
percentage actually observed. If the deviation was less than 10 percentage points, then
they would get one extra point.
At the very end of the experimental sessions, we conducted a short survey in which we
asked participants whether they agreed or disagreed with three statements about trust:
101) \In general, people can be trusted.", 2) \Nowadays, you can't rely on anybody.", and
3) \Dealing with strangers, it is better to be cautious before trusting them.". Participants
answered on a 4-point scale (1 \Agree Strongly", 2 \Agree Slightly", 3 \Disagree Slightly",
and 4 \Disagree Strongly"). We created an individual variable, Trust, by adding the
answers to the three questions and assigning a 1 for the least amount of trust and 4
the highest amount of trust per question (answers to question 1 are reversed coded).
This is used to help capture individual dierences in beliefs about trustworthiness in our
statistical analysis.
Experiment 2: Punishment. In Experiment 2, two players A1 and A2 played a PD
as in Experiment 1, but we added two additional players, B1 and B2. Each B-player was
endowed with 70 points. B1 could assign up to 10 deduction points to A1, and B2 could do
the same to A2. Each deduction point subtracted three points from the A-player, and cost
the B-player one point of his endowment. The B-players could condition their choices on
the actions of A1 and A2. Thus Experiment 2 incorporated the possibility of third-party
punishment (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), and is suited for examining determinants of
whether punishment takes the form of norm enforcement (selectively punishing defection)
or antisocial punishment (punishing both cooperation and defection). As punishment is
costly, a selsh B-player would never punish.
To examine the impact of group membership on norm enforcement, we varied the com-
position of players in each game in a between-subject design. For the remainder of the
paper, we refer to the group composition in Experiment 2 from B1's perspective. Thus,
A1 always refers to the player that the B-player can punish, while we refer to the other
A-player as A2. The four dierent group compositions we implemented are shown in
Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here.]
11Varying the group membership of A1 (while keeping constant the group membership of
A2) allows us to investigate how the group identity of the person being punished (A1)
matters. We also study how punishment varies with the group aliation of A2, the person
aected by A1's actions. Appendix C provides a translation of the instructions for one
group composition in the Neutral Group Environment treatment.
2.3 Economic Environment Treatments
We used two treatments to analyze the eect of the economic environment on cooperation
and punishment behavior within and between groups.
Neutral Group Environment (NG): In this treatment, we used the randomly assigned
groups as our group manipulation and varied the group composition as described above.
There was no economic competition between the platoons. Results from this treatment
were previously presented in Goette et al. (2006).
Competitive Group Environment (CG): We added competition to the `Neutral
Group Environment' treatment by oering a bonus to the platoon that got the high-
est payo in the PD stage. The bonus was 20 points for each member if the platoon got
the highest average payo in the PD. In case of a tie between two platoons, the winner was
randomly determined. Because the bonus was based on average payos for pairs playing
the PD, and cooperation maximized payos for the pair, cooperation facilitated winning
the bonus for the platoon. Importantly, however, the bonus did not change the incentives
for a selsh individual: the best strategy for a selsh A-player was still to defect (for the
intuition and a formal test, see section 3 on the behavioral hypothesis). Furthermore,
in Experiment 2 the bonus was calculated based on the A-player average payos before
deducting any punishment points imposed by the B-players. B-players (and A-players)
knew this. Thus the bonus was irrelevant for the choices of the B-players, regardless of
12whether they were selsh or altruistic. The rules of the game were made clear in the
instructions, and we only began the experiment after control questions veried that all
participants understood them.
2.4 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was conducted with paper-and-pencil in a large auditorium and lasted
45 minutes. Subjects did not know of the experiment in advance.
Special care was taken to ensure anonymity. First, subjects were never told the identity
of their partner(s). Second, they knew that payos would be mailed to home addresses
ten days after the experiment, so that all participants would only learn the outcome of
the experiment after JOTP was over and they were no longer with their platoon. These
conditions ensured that the experiment was truly one-shot, and that defection was the
optimal choice for a selsh individual. For example, subjects did not need to fear reprisal
after the experiment if they chose to defect. Additionally, our procedure eliminated the
possibility that punishment might have a benet in future interactions as participants
only knew about the outcome of the experiment after the groups got dissolved. Points
earned were converted into Swiss Francs (one point = 0.25 CHF) and the subjects earned
on average CHF 14.4 (approximately $14). There was no show-up fee.
Overall, 525 subjects participated in the experiments: 228 in the `Neutral Group Environ-
ment' treatment and 297 in the `Competitive Group Environment' treatment. 281 were
assigned the role of A-players and participated in Experiment 1. Half were assigned to
the in-group treatment, and half to the out-group treatment. In the few cases in which
the groups had an uneven number of A-players, we randomly used the action of some
A-players twice to calculate payos. The payo of these players was determined by the
decisions associated with the rst match. After participating in Experiment 1, these
13same subjects participated as A-players in Experiment 2. This procedure introduces a
possible order eect for the A-players, but choices of the A-players in Experiment 2 are
not of interest for our purposes as we analyze cooperation of A-players in Experiment
1 and norm enforcement of B-players in Experiment 2. 244 subjects were assigned the
role of B-players. They participated only in Experiment 2, and were assigned to one of
four conditions (see Figure 1). We elicited B-players' deduction points using the strategy
method, i.e., they specied how many points to deduct from their associated A-player for
each possible combination of actions by A1 and A2.
3 Behavioral Hypotheses
This section develops behavioral hypotheses on how the competitive environment might
aect cooperation and punishment behavior. If individuals do not have (group-specic)
prosocial preferences, individuals will always defect in the PD game, since this is a dom-
inant strategy. Similarly for punishment, a selsh individual would never punish another
player as punishment is costly and there is no benet of punishment in this one-shot
interaction.
The competitive environment, i.e. the small bonus in the CG treatment, does not change
the predictions for a selsh player. The intuition is straightforward: Cooperation never
leads to an increased payo, because it costs 20 points, and the bonus is only 20 points. In
fact, our rules for tie-breaking in case two groups have the same number of points imply
that individuals always must expect to lose money when cooperating, because the bonus
is only 10 in expected terms. Thus, adding competition cannot generate an increase in
cooperation rates through selsh incentives; an increase in cooperation under competition
must reect an eect working through non-selsh motives then (see Appendix A for a
proof). The competitive environment also has zero impact on punishment choices of a
14selsh B-player, by construction. The rules of the game are such that the competition
is determined without taking into account punishment. Thus, punishment can have no
inuence on the likelihood of winning the bonus. Hence, our null-hypothesis can be
summarized as follows:
H0 : With selsh players, defection by A-players and no punishment by B-players will be
the dominant strategies - both in NG and in CG.
Of course, past research has shown that people are not only willing to cooperate and
to punish (for surveys, see Fehr and Schmidt, 2003; Meier, 2007) but that they have
group specic social preferences (for evidence with minimal groups, see, e.g., Chen and
Li, 2009). With group-specic social preferences, a competitive environment can change
individuals' behavior. It has been shown that inter-group competition increases intra-
group cooperation and coordination within \minimal" groups (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef,
1994; Bornstein et al., 2002) and real, self-selected, groups (Augenblick and Cunha, 2009).
Recent evolutionary models provide an explanation how such group-specic social pref-
erences can survive: In general, the idea of (cultural) group selection argues that a pat-
tern of altruistic cooperation, and altruistic punishment of defectors, can emerge within
groups. These altruistic behaviors can survive because they enhance group tness, and
make groups composed of altruists more likely to survive environmental shocks (Henrich,
2004; Boyd et al., 2003). Crucially, altruism must be parochial, or preferentially directed
towards own group members, otherwise altruistic groups lose their relative tness advan-
tage.
Antisocial punishment can emerge, however, with the introduction of competition for re-
sources between groups. In this case the seemingly benign trait of altruism can play a
surprising role, because enhancing own-group tness is not the only way to win: damaging
competitor groups is also a viable strategy. In addition to being even more cooperative
15within their group, altruists might become hostile towards other groups, and use anti-
social punishment as a way to damage outsiders. This taste for hostility could survive
because it reinforces the relative tness advantage of groups with altruists (Choi and
Bowles, 2007; Bowles, 2009). These arguments are summarized in two alternative hy-
potheses, one for A-players and one for B-players.
H1 : A-players with group-specic social preferences cooperate more often with in-group
members in CG than in NG.
H2 : B-players with group-specic social preferences punish out-group members more often
in CG than in NG.
4 Results
We present the results in two steps: rst we analyze the impact of group membership
and the economic environment on cooperative behavior. Second, we show how group
boundaries and a competitive environment aect punishment behavior.
4.1 Cooperation and Beliefs About Cooperation
Panel A in Figure 2 shows the fraction of individuals cooperating as a function of the
group composition and the treatment. In general, the gure shows that individuals are
willing to cooperate in the PD and that they exhibit in-group favoritism. In the NG
treatment, there is a signicant and large increase in cooperation if individuals are paired
with someone from their own platoon rather than another platoon. In fact, cooperation
rates are 18 percentage points higher for within-group interactions than between-group.
Notably, the lower cooperation rates with out-group members need not indicate hostility,
but might simply indicate less willingness to deviate from the dominant selsh strategy
16when paired with an out-group member. In the CG treatment, favoritism towards the
in-group is even more extreme, with cooperation rates being 36 percentage points higher
in within-group than between-group interactions. Thus, the increase in cooperation rates
among in-group members is stronger in the competitive environment. However, our results
also show that out-group cooperation is not decreasing in CG (a pattern also found in
dierent contexts by Rand et al. (2009) and Herrmann et al. (2008)). Thus, competition
does not lead individuals to express hostility toward the out-group by defecting more
often. This could reect the limited \expressive value" of defection; individuals might
not see defection as a way to unambiguously express hostility, given that it also coincides
with the dominant selsh strategy. Overall, the ndings on cooperation support the view
that in-group favoritism does not necessarily entail hostility towards the out-group (see,
e.g., Bahry et al., 2005).
Panel B in Figure 2 shows that the results on cooperation behavior are fully reected in
the individuals' beliefs; people report that they expect in-group favoritism in NG, and
signicantly greater favoritism in CG.
[ Figure 2 and Table 2 about here.]
The results in Figure 2 are also conrmed in logit models of the following form
coopi =  + 0IGi + 1IGi  CGi + CGi + xi + ei (1)
where coop is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individual i cooperates, and zero otherwise.
IG is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual is paired with another individual
from his platoon (in-group) and zero if the other player is from another platoon. The
indicator variable CGi is equal to 1 for the `Competitive Group Environment' treatment,
and zero otherwise. In some specications, we also add control variables x, an index of
17a person's self-reported trust (explained in Section 2.1), to increase the precision of the
estimates. For ease of interpretation, we report marginal eects.
Results in column (1) of Table 2 show that there is a signicant overall in-group eect
of almost 30 percentage points. Columns (2) and (3) separate the eects of group mem-
bership in the two treatments. In the NG treatment, cooperation is about 20 percentage
points higher if the interaction is in-group (p = 0:03 in column (2), and p = 0:05 in col-
umn (3)). The strength of the in-group eect depends on the economic environment. The
interaction term between IG and CG shows that the cooperation dierential in in-group
interactions is about 20 percentage points larger when there is competition (p = 0:07 in
column (2), and p = 0:021 in column (3), where we include an index of trust questions).
We can also estimate OLS models5 similar to those above with the dependent variable
being belik, which is individual i's belief about the percentage of individuals cooperating
in the two group congurations, k. Because we use two observations per individual, we
adjust the error terms by clustering on individuals for possible correlations in eik within
individuals. The results, displayed in columns (4) to (6) of Table 2, show that there is
a strong overall in-group eect in beliefs, of almost the identical magnitude as observed
in behavior (p < 0:01; column (4)). We then separate the in-group eect in the two
environments. Beliefs about cooperation are signicantly higher for in-group pairings in
NG, about the same magnitude as we nd for behavior. There is a signicant interaction
with the economic environment: The in-group dierential is 13 percentage points larger
in CG than in NG (p < 0:01 in both specications). All in-group dierentials in beliefs
are within a standard deviation of the in-group dierentials in cooperation, showing that
the individuals had well-calibrated beliefs.
In sum, group membership per se creates in-group favoritism, i.e. individuals cooperate
5Estimating the same specication with tobit models does not change the results. Results are available
from the authors upon request.
18more with in-group members than with out-group members. This eect is also reected
in people's beliefs. Randomly adding competition between the groups increases the in-
group favoritism even though it does not change the predictions for individuals under the
assumption of selsh preferences. This indicates that a competitive environment has an
impact of group-specic social preferences. Importantly, competition increases in-group
cooperation without reducing out-group cooperation. Thus, just looking at cooperation,
one would conclude that competition between groups increases social eciency.
4.2 Punishment
We now turn to the analysis of B-players' punishment behavior. Figure 3 displays the
results for punishment in situations in which A2 cooperated. The gure allows us to
highlight two distinct motives related to the group membership. By varying the identity
of A1, the person who can be punished, we can see if punishment depends on whether
A1 was a member of the punisher's own group (dark lines) or another group (grey lines).
By varying the identity of A2, the player who is the potential victim of defection, we
can examine if punishment of A1 depends on whether the victim of defection was from
the punisher's group (solid lines) or some other group (dashed lines). The gure also
distinguishes between whether A1 cooperated or defected.
Panel A displays the results for the NG treatment. There is a clear pattern of norm
enforcement in the data: A1 is punished more strongly for defection than cooperation.
Punishment of A1 also depends on the identity of A2. If A1 defects, the solid lines (A2
from the punisher's group) are always above the dashed lines (A2 from another group).
Thus, individuals are especially prone to punish defection if the \victim" of defection is
from the in-group. These results are consistent with the prediction that punishers engage
in altruistic punishment in a way that enforces a norm of cooperation toward members
19of their own group. They also mirror the in-group favoritism observed for cooperation
behavior. It is also evident from the gure that the identity of A2 does not matter if A1
cooperates. This indicates a lack of hostility in this treatment. Hostility would imply
stronger punishment of an A1 that belongs to another group, regardless of what A1 does.
As can be seen in the graph, there is essentially no dierence as a function of A1's group
aliation. In sum, group boundaries per se do not create hostility in punishment.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Turning to the competition treatment in panel B, we see that the punishment choices
are starkly dierent. Most importantly, there is now a clear dierence in punishment
depending on whether A1 belongs to the punisher's own group or not. Grey lines (A1 is
from another group) are clearly above the dark lines (A1 is from the punisher's group).
Thus, out-group individuals are punished signicantly harder than in-group members,
and importantly, this is true no matter whether the individual cooperates or defects (grey
lines are above dark lines in both cases). Thus, the introduction of competition leads
to substantial antisocial punishment or hostility. Furthermore, there is no relationship
between the identity of A2 and punishment in CG, so the tendency to preferentially
punish defection against the in-group is no longer present.
The two dierent economic environments (neutral and competitive) generated qualita-
tively dierent patterns of punishment, as is evident in the gure. A formal statistical
test conrms this impression: We estimate the following OLS regressions:6
PPik =  + 1Ii(A1 out-group) + 2Ii(A2 in-group) + ei (2)
where PP are the punishment points that individual i assigns in case k. We include two
6The results are maintained in tobit regressions and can be obtained upon request.
20indicator variables to capture the eect of the group composition on i's punishment; I(A2
in-group) is equal to 1 if player A2 is from the same group as B1 and 0 otherwise and
I(A1 out-group) is equal to 1 if player A1 is from another group as B1 and 0 otherwise.
We estimate equation (2) separately for the two cases where A1 cooperates and the
two cases where A1 defects, and estimate these again separately for NG and CG. The
coecients across columns are compared in the bottom panel using two-sided 2-tests
(see Appendix B for a formal expression of the tests). Table 3 displays the result for
the case in which A2 cooperates. The table shows that in the NG treatment, i.e. in
the neutral environment, we nd stronger punishment of defection against a member of
one's own group, i.e. A2 is an in-group member (p = 0:05, column(1)), but no eect
of the identity of A1 on punishment (p = 0:85, column (1)). Importantly, in the NG
environment, there is no eect of the group composition on punishment of cooperation
(column (3)). In contrast, in CG, we observe a dierent pattern in punishment. This can
be seen in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3. The identity of A2 is no longer signicant.
However, A1 gets punished more heavily, whether he cooperates or defects, if he is from
a dierent group than the punisher, i.e. A1 is out-group (p < 0:01 in columns (2) and
(4)). Hence, there is substantial antisocial punishment.
The comparison of the coecients across columns, i.e. the neutral vs. the competitive
environment, in the lower panel of Table 3 shows that in treatment CG, A1 is punished
more heavily than in NG if he is out-group (p < 0:01). This is true for whether A1
defects or cooperates. The dierent punishment pattern conditional on the identity of A2
is not statistically signicant. In sum, we clearly reject the hypothesis that the eect of
A1's and A2's group aliation on punishment are the same across the two treatments
(p < 0:01 for both, defection and cooperation of A1). And the results show substantial
antisocial punishment in the CG treatment.
21[Table 3 about here.]
The results are also robust (qualitatively the same, but slightly weaker) to adding the
cases in which A2 defected. Obviously, in the case in which A1 cooperates and A2
defects, A1 has a payo of zero and punishment can't reduce his payo further. So due
to censoring there is no punishment in this case { even in CG. Nevertheless, individuals
exhibit hostility in punishment also in the case when A1 defects and A2 defects. For
reasons of succinctness, the detailed results have been relegated to the Appendix (see
Figure A1 and Table A1 there).
Figure 3 additionally indicates that norm enforcement might be weaker in CG than in
NG, i.e. that punishment seems to depend less on A1's behavior in CG than in NG:
While in Panel A of Figure 3 punishment is clearly higher when A1 defects, regardless of
the group composition, that relationship is almost completely muted in Panel B. In order
to examine the dierential in punishment between cooperation and defection, we estimate
for each treatment the following equations:
PPik =  + 1Ii(A1 out-group) + 2Ii(A2 in-group) + 3Ik(A1 defects) + ei (3)
PPik = + 1Ii(A1 out-group) + 2Ii(A2 in-group) (4)
+ 4Ik(A1 defects)  Ii(A2 out-group) + 5Ik(A1 defects)  Ii(A2 in-group) + ei
in which A1 defects equals 1 if A1 defects and 0 otherwise. Regression 4 adds two
interaction terms for A1 defects and whether A2 is an out-group member or an in-group
member.
22The results (displayed in Table 4) show that defection is more strongly punished than
cooperation in NG (p < 0:01, column (1)). This eect is less strong in CG as seen in
column (2). A formal test comparing the two coecients, 3, shows that the dierence
is signicant (p < 0:01) and conditioning of punishment on actions of A1 is much weaker
in CG, while it is still signicant. As can be seen from comparing coecient 4 across
columns (3) and (4), this eect of competition in CG even prevails when A2 is from the
punisher's own group (p = 0:03), the case when norm enforcement was strongest in NG.
Finally, it is noteworthy from column (4) that the norm enforcement pattern of punish-
ment if defection is directed against one's own group has completely disappeared in the
competitive environment. The fact that individuals cease to use punishment to enforce
cooperation among in-group members in a competitive environment might seem surpris-
ing, from the perspective of increasing group tness. However, our results on cooperation
showed that competition leads to very high within-group cooperation rates, even in the
absence of punishment threat, mitigating this problem for the group. In summary, compe-
tition causes punishment to stop functioning as a tool for norm enforcement, and instead
to take the form of antisocial punishment directed towards the out-group, consistent with
predictions given group-specic social preferences.
[Table 4 about here.]
5 Conclusions
Punishment is a double-edged sword. While it can have positive eects on the level of
cooperation within groups by enforcing a norm to contribute to a group's welfare (e.g.,
Fehr and Gachter, 2000), it can also be detrimental for society by sanctioning cooperative
behavior (e.g., Herrmann et al., 2008). In this paper we have investigated the conditions
23under which the upside (altruistic) or downside (antisocial) of punishment prevails. Our
results have shown that the interaction of group boundaries, and the economic environ-
ment surrounding the groups, can generate two starkly dierent patterns of cooperation
and punishment behaviors. In the absence of competition between groups, individuals
cooperate more within their group, and use punishment to enforce cooperation norms
towards their group. Group boundaries per se do therefore not lead to inherent hostility
towards others in punishment. However, the punishment patterns change dramatically
when we introduce competition between groups. We nd strong out-group hostility, in the
form of antisocial punishment of the out-group, but also increased in-group cooperation.
These ndings support evolutionary models predicting hostility and aggression between
groups in competitive settings (Choi and Bowles, 2007; Bowles, 2009).
Our results provide insights into the origins of conict along group lines, and have impor-
tant economic implications in terms of understanding the role of group boundaries and
inter-group competition within organizations. While Bandiera et al. (2010) show the im-
pact of social ties on behavior within an organization, we use random assignment to groups
as an exogenous manipulation of social ties and show that the economic environment can
elicit substantially dierent behavior with respect to cooperation and punishment. This
implies that organizations might face a tradeo, for instance, when designing incentive
schemes for work-teams. While increasing competition between teams increases coop-
eration within teams it also changes the nature of informal sanctions. The sanctioning
mechanism not only loses its often praised benets but takes the form of between-group
hostility potentially outweighing benets from increased in-group cooperation.
Our results also provide additional evidence that social preferences are endogenous to
the economic environment (Bowles, 1998; Burks et al., 2009). This literature argues that
changes in economic environments bring about changes in preferences. Yet, these changes
are typically assumed to be slow, e.g., operating through slow-changing norms of cooper-
24ation (Herrmann et al., 2008). It is noteworthy that we observe a particularly strong form
of endogenous preferences: Our treatments are between-subject manipulations, and still
we immediately observe starkly dierent punishment and cooperation strategies, condi-
tional on the economic environment. Thus, this evidence suggests that dierent motives
of social preferences may be dormant in humans, and triggered by dierent economic
environments.
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29Tables and Figures
Table 1: O-Duty Time Spent per Week
Own Platoon Other Platoon
Less than once 4.5% 30.4%
Between 1 and 2 times 45.0% 44.0%
Twice or more 50.5% 25.7%
N 489 491
Note: The two distributions are signicantly dierent (Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank test, p < 0:001).
30Table 2: Results for Cooperation Rates and Beliefs about Cooperation
Dependent Variable: Cooperation (=1) Beliefs: % cooperating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ingroup (=1) 0.28*** 0.18** 0.17* 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CG (=1) 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.06* -0.06*
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
IngroupCG 0.18* 0.22** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04)
Trust 0.06*** 0.03***
(0.02) (0.01)
Constant 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.34***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
(Pseudo)-R2 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.20 0.21 0.25
# of observations 281 281 267 538 538 515
# of individuals 281 281 267 274 274 262
Notes: In column (1) to (3), marginal eects from logit models. In columns (3) and (4) coecients from
OLS models. The model in columns (4) to (6) uses two observations per individual (if available), therefore
standard errors of the estimates in column (4) to (6) are adjusted for clustering on individuals.
Level of signicance:  : 0:05  p < 0:1,  : 0:01  p < 0:05,  : p < 0:01.
31Table 3: Punishment as a Function of Group Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Behavior of A1: A1 defects A1 cooperates
Environment: Neutral Comp Neutral Comp
A1 out-group (1) 0.155 3.742*** {0.099 2.898***
(0.853) (0.658) (0.693) (0.684)
A2 in-group (2) 1.694** 0.868 0.535 {0.544
(0.840) (0.676) (0.697) (0.693)
Constant 4.487*** 1.636*** 2.307*** 1.988***
(0.705) (0.447) (0.578) (0.517)
R2 0.039 0.203 0.005 0.125
# of observations/individuals 111 132 111 132
Tests across equations (environments):
Test that 1 diers p < 0:01 p < 0:01
Test that 2 diers p = 0:44 p = 0:27
Test that 1 and 2 dier p < 0:01 p < 0:01
Note: Dependent variable: # of deduction points. OLS estimates for the cases in which A2
cooperates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. p-values in cross-equation tests are all
two-sided.
Level of signicance:  : 0:05  p < 0:1,  : 0:01  p < 0:05,  : p < 0:01.
32Table 4: Norm Enforcement Across Environments
Environment: Neutral Comp Neutral Comp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A1 out-group (1) 0.028 3.320*** 0.028 3.320***
(0.624) (0.589) (0.625) (0.590)
A2 in-group (2) 1.114* 0.162 0.513 {0.533
(0.609) (0.595) (0.691) (0.694)
A1 defects (3) 2.838*** 0.682**
(0.445) (0.330)
A1 defects  A2 out-group (4) 3.510*** 1.482***
(0.722) (0.560)
A1 defects  A2 in-group (5) 2.306*** 0.092
(0.549) (0.385)
Constant 1.978*** 1.471*** 2.244*** 1.766***
(0.565) (0.465) (0.578) (0.495)
R2 0.130 0.161 0.136 0.167
# of observations 222 264 222 264
# of individuals 111 132 111 132
Tests across equations (environments):
Test that 1 diers p < 0:01 p < 0:01
Test that 2 diers p = 0:26 p = 0:29
Test that 3 diers p < 0:01
Test that 4 diers p = 0:03
Test that 5 diers p < 0:01
Test that 1, 2, and 3 dier p < 0:01
Test that 1, 2, 4, and 5 diers p < 0:01
Note: Dependent variable: # of deduction points. OLS estimates. Robust standard
errors clustered on the individual in parentheses.
Level of signicance:  : 0:05  p < 0:1,  : 0:01  p < 0:05,  : p < 0:01. p-values
in cross-equation tests are all two-sided.
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B1  B2  A2  A1 
B1  B2  A2  A1 
B1  B2  A2  A1 
B1  B2  A2  A1 
Note: The game allowed B1 to punish A1, and B2 to punish A2, conditional on
the actions and A1 and A2 in a simultaneous prisoners' dilemma game. The dark
shading indicates the four possible group combinations for B1, A1, and A2, which
were implemented as dierent treatments (players with the same shading are from
the same group). The design deliberately did not vary all possible combinations
of B1 and B2 group roles, because of number of observations, so the eect of B2
group identity on B1 behavior is not studied. The pattern of B-player (and A-player)
group compositions was identical across the Economic Environments, the NG and
CG treatments.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: The bars show standard errors of the mean. White indicates an out-group pairing while dark
indicates an in-group pairing. Panel A shows the fraction of A-players passing their endowment to the
other player in a simultaneous one-shot PD. Panel B shows beliefs about the fraction of A-players who
pass their endowment in the PD.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: B-players could deduct between 0 and 10 points. Each deduction point costs B-players 1 point
and A1-players 3 points. Deduction points were made conditional on whether A1-players cooperated or
defected using the strategy method. Error bars show standard errors of the mean.
Figure 3: Punishment in the case A2-player cooperated
36Appendix
37A Nash Equilibrium in the PD in Competitive Group
Environment
In this section, we explain why it was optimal for selsh A-players to defect in the Com-
petitive Group Environment. The intuition is straightforward: Cooperating never leads to
an increased payo, because cooperating costs 20 points, and the bonus is only 20 points.
In fact, our rules for tie-breaking in case two groups have the same number of points
imply that individuals always lose money when cooperating, because the bonus is only 10
in expected terms. Thus, adding competition cannot generate an increase in cooperation
rates through selsh incentives; an increase in cooperation under competition must reet
an aect working through non-selsh motives. Below, we formalize the intuition that the
Nash equilibrium doesn't change between NG and CG.
We show that the Nash equilibrium in the game involves all (selsh) A-players defecting.
(i) In our experiment, there are within-group and between-group pairings. Obviously, a
selsh player never cooperates with a player from another group, since, on top of costing
him 20 points, he may also be pivotal in losing the bonus. Therefore, what remains to be
considered are within-group pairings. First consider the case of K = 2 groups, denoted X
and Y . Now pick an arbitrary collection of strategies in which some individuals cooperate
in within-group pairings. We ask whether this strategy can be a Nash equilibrium. Two
possible cases can arise: Either one of the groups, say group Y , loses, or the two groups
tie.
We rst show that groups can never tie with some individuals cooperating.
 Pick an arbitrary member of group k who is cooperating. Since the groups are tied,
he wins a bonus with probability 0.5. If he defects, his group will lose for sure.
However, defecting saves 20 points, while costing only 10 points in expected bonus.
Thus, when two groups are tied, cooperating players have an incentive to defect.
We now show that it is impossible to have a Nash equilibrium in which group Y loses for
sure.
 If group Y loses, then it cannot be a Nash equilibrium for anyone in group Y to
cooperate. Given the others' strategies, members of Y who cooperate can increase
their payo by 20 points if they defect.
 Given this result, it follows that in group X, at most one player will cooperate. If
more than one player in group X cooperated, a player could switch to defection
while still winning the bonus, holding the other players' strategies constant.
 However, if one player in X cooperates, the tying rule now implies that the player
can defect, and save 20 points, but only lose 10 points in expected bonus (since the
two groups now tie).
38Thus, the only equilibrium for K = 2 groups involves both groups tying, and this equi-
librium involves all players defecting.
(iii) The above arguments immediately generalize to K > 2 groups. The only dierence
is that the expected bonus in the case of a tie will be even smaller, 20=m, where m  K
is the number of groups tying. Thus, the same reasoning applies.
B Comparisons across Equations
The bottom panels of Table 3 to 4 also display cross-equation tests. For single-coecient
tests, we calculate
z =
j   ~ j q
jj + ~ jj
(5)
where j and ~ j are the two coecients of interest from the two equations, and jj and
~ jj are the corresponding main diagonal elements in the covariance matrix (because the
two coecients come from two separate equations, their covariance, by construction, is
zero). z has a standard normal distribution under the null of no dierence. We report
two-sided p-values to be conservative. In the case of coecient vectors, we calculate the
analogous test statistic
 = (   ~ )( + ~ )
 1(   ~ )
0 (6)
which has a chi-square distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k is the number of
variables in .
39C Appendix with Experimental Instructions
C.1 Instructions Player A (Translation)
What is this about?
Two subjects participate in this decision situation. They will be called A1 and A2. Both, A1 and
A2, will get an endowment of 20 points. Each participants has to decide between two options:
 Keep: The participant keeps his 20 points.
 Transfer: The participant transfers his 20 points to the other participants. The transfered
points will be doubled.
Each participant has to decide whether to Keep or the Transfer without knowing how the other
participant decided. So, the following payos can result:
Payos in this case:
Case 1: A1 keeps the points A1: 20 points
A2 keeps the points A2: 20 points
Payos in this case:
Case 2: A1 transfers 20 points A1: 0 points
A2 keeps the points A2: 60 points
Payos in this case:
Case 3: A2 keeps the points A1: 60 points
A2 transfers 20 points A2: 0 points
Payos in this case:
Case 4: A1 transfers 20 points A1: 40 points
A2 transfers 20 points A2: 40 points
How will you decide?
 You will be in the role of A1.
 Your assigned participant A2 is from another platoon.
None of the participants will ever nd out to whom he was assigned. We guarantee total
anonymity. When all the participants reached a decision, we will calculate the points and the
resulting monetary payos in the following way:
4 points = CHF1
The amount will be delivered to you by mail.
40Everything clear?
Before you decide, answer the following questions. The question make sure that all the partici-
pants understand the instructions.
If you have questions, please contact the sta.
1. A1 and A2 keep their points. Please calculate the resulting points for all participants.
State all the steps in getting to the result.
2. A1 and A2 transfer their points. Please calculate the resulting points for all participants.
State all the steps in getting to the result.
3. A1 keeps his points and A2 transfer his points. Please calculate the resulting points for
all participants. State all the steps in getting to the result.
Please contact the sta when you are done with the questions or if you have questions.
Decision Sheet
 You were assigned the role of A1.
 Your assigned participant A2 is from another platoon.
In the following gure are the participants from the other platoons shaded.
Exp-ID: «ExpID»  3     
ENTSCHEIDUNGSBLATT FÜR ENTSCHEIDUNGSSITUATION 1 
 
   Ihnen wurde die Rolle von A1 zugeteilt. 
   Der Ihnen zugeteilte Teilnehmer A2 ist aus der Klasse 3. 










Bitte entscheiden Sie sich jetzt für eine der beiden Möglichkeiten:  
 
 
   
      Behalten 
   








Bitte melden Sie sich bei einem der Experimentleiter,  
wenn Sie sich entschieden haben. 
A1  A2 
Keep or Transfer 
Keep or Transfer 
Please decide which option to pick:
 Keep
 Transfer
Please let the sta know when you decided.
C.2 Instructions Player B (Translation)
What is this about?
Four subjects participate in this decision situation. They will be called A1, A2, B1 and B2. The
decision situation will have two steps.
Step 1: A1 and A2 will get an endowment of 20 points. Each participants has to decide between
two options:
41 Keep: The participant keeps his 20 points.
 Transfer: The participant transfers his 20 points to the other participants. The transfered
points will be doubled.
Each participant has to decide whether to Keep or the Transfer without knowing how the other
participant decided. So, the following payos can result:
Payos in this case:
Case 1: A1 keeps the points A1: 20 points
A2 keeps the points A2: 20 points
Payos in this case:
Case 2: A1 transfers 20 points A1: 0 points
A2 keeps the points A2: 60 points
Payos in this case:
Case 3: A2 keeps the points A1: 60 points
A2 transfers 20 points A2: 0 points
Payos in this case:
Case 4: A1 transfers 20 points A1: 40 points
A2 transfers 20 points A2: 40 points
Step 2: B1 and B2 will get an endowment of 70 points each and A1 and A2 will get another
10 points each. In Step 2, B1 and B2 can assign deduction points. B1 can assigned deduction
points to A1 and B2 can assign deduction points to A2. B1 and B2 can each assign a maximum
of 10 deduction points.
Before explaining how B1 and B2 will make their decisions, we will describe how deduction
points will change the payos. Each deduction point will reduce the payo of B by one
point and the payo of A by three points. For example, if B1 assigns 3 deduction points,
this will reduce A1's payo by 9 points and B1's payo by 3 points.
B1 and B2 will decide about the assignment of deduction points for each potential case in Step
1. That is, they will decide about assigning deduction points for the following four potential
cases in Step 1:
 Case 1: A1 and A2 keep their points.
 Case 2: A1 transfers his points and A2 keeps his points.
 Case 3: A1 keeps his points and A2 transfers his points.
 Case 4: A1 and A2 transfer their points.
This will lead to the following payos:
How will you decide?
 You will be in the role of B1.
 Your assigned participant A1 is from another platoon.
42Payo of A1 = Payo from Step 1
+ 10 points from Step 2
- 3*Deduction points from B1
Payo of A2 = Payo from Step 1
+ 10 points from Step 2
- 3*Deduction points from B2
Payo of B1 = Endowment of 70 points
- Deduction points to A1
Payo of B2 = Endowment of 70 points
- Deduction points to A2
 The participant A2 is from another platoon. He got assigned to a participant B2
from your platoon.
None of the participants will ever nd out to whom he was assigned. We guarantee total
anonymity. When all the participants reached a decision, we will calculate the points and the
resulting monetary payos in the following way:
4 points = CHF1
The amount will be delivered to you by mail.
Everything clear?
Before you decide, answer the following questions. The question make sure that all the partici-
pants understand the instructions.
If you have questions, please contact the sta.
1. In Step 1, A1 and A2 keep their points. In Step 2, neither B1 nor B2 assign any deduction
points. Please calculate the resulting points for all participants. State all the steps in
getting to the result.
2. In Step 1, A1 and A2 transfer their points. In Step 2, neither B1 nor B2 assign any
deduction points. Please calculate the resulting points for all participants. State all the
steps in getting to the result.
3. In Step 1, A1 keeps his points and A2 transfers his points. In Step 2, B1 assigns 2
deduction points and B2 assigns 5 deduction points. Please calculate the resulting points
for all participants. State all the steps in getting to the result.
4. In Step 1, A1 transfers his points and A2 transfers his points. In Step 2, B1 assigns 1
deduction points and B2 assigns 4 deduction points. Please calculate the resulting points
for all participants. State all the steps in getting to the result.
Please contact the sta when you are done with the questions or if you have questions.
43Decision Sheet
 You will be in the role of B1.
 Your assigned participant A1 is from another platoon.
 The participant A2 is from another platoon. He got assigned to a participant B2
from your platoon.
In the following gure are the participants from the other platoons shaded.
Exp-ID: «ExpID»  6 
ENTSCHEIDUNGSBLATT FÜR IHRE ENTSCHEIDUNGSSITUATION 
   Ihnen wurde die Rolle von B1 zugeteilt.  
   Der Ihnen zugeordnete Teilnehmer A1 ist aus der Klasse 3.  
   Der Teilnehmer A2 ist aus der Klasse 3. Er ist einem Teilnehmer B2 aus Ihrer 
Klasse zugeordnet. 
Wenn Ihre Klasse in Stufe 1 am meisten Punkte verdient hat, erhält jeder in Ihrer 
Klasse zusätzlich 20 Punkte. Im untenstehenden Diagramm sind die Teilnehmer aus 






Bitte treffen Sie die Entscheidungen bezüglich der Abzugspunkte für jeden möglichen 
Fall.  Nur  der  Fall,  der  tatsächlich  eintritt,  ist  relevant  für  die  Bestimmung  Ihres 
Verdienstes und den Verdiensten der anderen Teilnehmer. Sie können in jedem Fall 
zwischen 0 und 10 Abzugspunkte vergeben. 
A1  A2 
Keep or Transfer 
Keep or Transfer 





A1  A2 
A2 behält seine Punkte. 
A1 behält seine Punkte. 
In diesem Fall gebe ich A1  
____ Abzugspunkte. 
Fall 1: 
A1  A2 
A2 behält seine Punkte. 
A1 gibt 20 Punkte weiter. 
In diesem Fall gebe ich A1  
____ Abzugspunkte. 
Fall 2: 
A1  A2 
A2 gibt 20 Punkte weiter. 
A1 behält seine Punkte. 
In diesem Fall gebe ich A1  
____ Abzugspunkte. 
Fall 3: 
A1  A2 
A2 gibt 20 Punkte weiter. 
 
 
A1 gibt 20 Punkte weiter. 
In diesem Fall gebe ich A1  
____ Abzugspunkte. 
Fall 4: 
Please decide about the assignment of the deduction points for all possible cases. Only the cases
that really happen will determine your payo and the payo of the other participants. In each
of the cases, you can assign between 0 and 10 deduction points.
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   Ihnen wurde die Rolle von B1 zugeteilt.  
   Der Ihnen zugeordnete Teilnehmer A1 ist aus der Klasse 3.  
   Der Teilnehmer A2 ist aus der Klasse 3. Er ist einem Teilnehmer B2 aus Ihrer 
Klasse zugeordnet. 
Wenn Ihre Klasse in Stufe 1 am meisten Punkte verdient hat, erhält jeder in Ihrer 
Klasse zusätzlich 20 Punkte. Im untenstehenden Diagramm sind die Teilnehmer aus 






Bitte treffen Sie die Entscheidungen bezüglich der Abzugspunkte für jeden möglichen 
Fall.  Nur  der  Fall,  der  tatsächlich  eintritt,  ist  relevant  für  die  Bestimmung  Ihres 
Verdienstes und den Verdiensten der anderen Teilnehmer. Sie können in jedem Fall hen 
0 und 10 Abzugspunkte vergeben. 
A1  A2 
Keep or Transfer 
Keep or Transfer 





A1  A2 
A2 keeps his points. 
A1 keeps his points. 
In this case I assign A1  
____ deduction points. 
Case 1: 
A1  A2 
A2 keeps his points. 
 
A1 transfers his 20 points. 
In this case I assign A1  
____ deduction points. 
 
Case 2: 
A1  A2 
A2 transfers his 20 points. 
 
 
A1 keeps his points. 
  In this case I assign A1  
____ deduction points. 
 
Case 3: 
A1  A2 




A1 transfers his 20 points. 
  In this case I assign A1  
____ deduction points. 
 
Case 4: 
Please let the sta know when you decided.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: B-players could deduct between 0 and 10 points. Each deduction point costs B-players 1 point
and A1-players 3 points. Deduction points were made conditional on whether A1-players cooperated or
defected using the strategy method. Error bars show standard errors of the mean.
Figure A1: Punishment in the case A2-player defected
46Table A1: Punishment as a Function of Group Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Behavior of A1: A1 defects A1 cooperates
Environment: Neutral Comp Neutral Comp
A1 outgroup (1) {0.103 3.249*** 0.018 1.336***
(0.661) (0.549) (0.524) (0.470)
A2 ingroup (2) 1.445** 0.308 0.297 {0.485
(0.645) (0.558) (0.534) (0.469)
A2 defects (=1) {2.774*** {1.477*** {1.084*** {1.705***
(0.387) (0.269) (0.376) (0.401)
Constant 4.746*** 2.127*** 2.345*** 2.768***
(0.622) (0.420) (0.460) (0.438)
R2 0.141 0.205 0.028 0.091
# of observations 223 264 223 264
# of individual 112 132 112 132
Tests across equations (environments):
Test that 1 diers p < 0:01 p = 0:06
Test that 2 diers p = 0:18 p = 0:27
Test that 1 and 2 dier p < 0:001 p = 0:10
Note: Dependent variable: # of deduction points. OLS estimates. Robust
standard errors clustered on the individual in parentheses. p-values in cross-
equation tests are all two-sided.
Level of signicance:  : 0:05  p < 0:1,  : 0:01  p < 0:05,  : p < 0:01.
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